PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION BETWEEN ARAB AFRICAN STATES
INTRODUCTION
African states are now coming together to form a single market and are also trying to have a single currency under the umbrella of the African Union, just like the European Union. All these ideas came about when the regional organizations were successful in achieving free trade, easy migration etc. For example, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have achieved free trade but have not reached a decision on a single currency, though it was reported that the ECOWAS committee of nations will strive to achieve the single currency by 2020, (Herald, 2018).
Cooperation and integration between Arab African States can and will be achieved if the leaders of the Arab African countries are willing to join hands together to achieve the desired result. It will require members to harmonize their tax, monetary, and fiscal policies, create a common currency, and concede a certain amount of sovereignty to the supranational organization. The countries that make up the Arab African states are Algeria, Comoros, Egypt, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. These countries can acquire great economic viability worthy of emulation if they are to work together. Though there is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which has Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia as its members, (Francesco, 2008), which was established with the aim of enhancing trade. The Union has been unable to achieve tangible progress on its goals due to deep economic and political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria regarding, among others, the issue of Western Sahara, (Wikipedia)
Ways of achieving cooperation and integration are:
MULTI-LATERAL RELATIONS
Multilateralism was defined by Miles Kahler as "international governance" or global governance of the "many," and its central principle was "opposition to bilateral discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict, (Kahler, 1992). I believe a multilateral agreement between all the Arab African states will put these states at the forefront in African and in the Arab world. The decisions this group makes will not be taken with levity because their base will be strong financially, economically, militarily etc.
Multilateral relationships between Arab African nations will aid them immensely in terms of trade, affairs between the countries, aiding in economy and direct investments, education etc.
ECONOMIC PROSPECT
There can be an economic surge in the Arab African countries if there is free trade of goods. The benefits of ensuring a free trade between the countries are not limited to but include:
I.Duty-Free and Quota-Free Market Access and no quantitative restrictions on goods that meet requirements of the standard organizations, (Anzetwere 2014). In bringing goods through to the different Arab African countries, the principle of laissez faire can be adopted in which transactions between private parties are free from government intervention such as regulation, privileges, tariffs and subsidies. This will help in further movement of goods within the countries. Import and export of goods and services will increase astronomically. In order to prevent movement of substandard goods, government agencies in charge of standard will be at the borders to checkmate that.
II.Every country is bound to benefit due to different areas of specialisation: Ideally, each country has a comparative advantage in different areas of production and this allows partner countries to gain as a result of specialisation, (Monash University, 2001).
III.Competitiveness in the markets: There will be competition and also standard goods produced because customers will go for the best. A competitive market is one where there are numerous producers that compete with one another in hopes to provide goods and services, as consumers want and need. In other words, not one single producer can dictate the market. Also, like producers, not one consumer can dictate the market either.
IV.Attraction of foreign investment: Free trade will leave the door open for foreign investors bringing in new players into the markets and thereby creating more jobs into the country.
V.Introduction of a single currency can be beneficial to the Arab African countries. For example, Egypt is presently going through high inflation; the situation can be managed if there is a central economy and any country can be bailed out if such a country is having problems economically.
EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
Programs of international cooperation in higher education claim to promote peace and intercultural understanding, contribute to development of efficient human resources as well as research and innovation, (Donchenko, 2015). Technological innovations can be developed in the Arab African countries which will push the countries forward. They will be an embodiment of human resources, ideas can be exchanged to further boost education in the countries, and making the Arab African countries a melting pot will also promote peace among its citizens. Activities of higher education institutions in regards to internationalization include student and faculty mobility; attracting international students; joint research projects; curriculum development and enhancement; joint or double degrees; development and capacity building projects; campus internationalization, (Donchenko, 2015).
Educational exchange programmes can be initiated between Arab African universities which will help foster unity among them. Scholarship for exceptionally brilliant students can be initiated to build the human resources.
PEACE INITIATIVES/ MANAGING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS
Armed conflicts need to be prevented, mediated, managed and resolved at multiple levels, from the local through the national to the regional and trans-regional, (Dewaal, 2017). Arab African states can help themselves by bringing warring parties together to draw up peace accords which will advertently affect the Arab African states positively.
The conflict in Libya, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant branch in Tunisia conflict, the insurgency in the Maghreb in Algeria, the insurgency in the Maghreb in Tunisia, the insurgency in the Ogaden in Morocco, etc. National level conflict drivers, including electoral and post-election violence, disputed power transitions, unrepresentative and undemocratic security services, and challenges to the over-centralization of power, are also important, (Dewaal, 2017). All these conflicts drivers can be attended to and the various conflicts checked if the leaders of the Arab African states come together to build a regional army that will help manage conflicts until it can be resolved through the round table in form of mediation.
Managing conflicts can be easily achieved than resolving conflicts. Proponents of this approach believe that attempts to resolve conflicts are unrealistic, so rather than dealing with basic issues, attention should be concentrated on ameliorating the symptoms of the conflict, and in this way reducing suffering (Ryan 1990). No conflict however, no matter how protracted cannot be resolved. Not merely will disruptive conflict behaviour cease and hostile attitudes and perceptions at least be ameliorated, but the ultimate source of conflict (that is, the situation of goal incompatibility) will also be removed so that no unsatisfied goals remain to plague the future, (Mitchell, 1989). Conflict resolution offers a more viable outcome to conflict, because it converts the conflict into a shared problem, setting up a process in which both sides participate equally in finding solutions which are acceptable to both and which, therefore, are self-sustaining, (Light,1984).
ESTABLISHING A REGIONAL POLICE
Joining forces together to introduce a regional police to combat terrorism will be welcoming in the face of violent extremist activities springing up on daily basis. This regional police will have operational offices in each Arab African state and should be able to spring into action if called upon. They will be able to nip any attack or extremists at the bud.
The regional police project will be capital intensive but achieving it will be a laudable project that will enhance security of citizens within the Arab African region. Language that is a barrier in most regions will not be applicable in the Arab African states thus putting them at the forefront.
CONCLUSION
The Arab African states can provide the leadership Africa really needs if they seize the opportunity. The cooperation and integration between Arab African states will be a plus to the countries involved. Coming together in the areas mentioned above will make them a formidable power in all areas in Africa and in the world. Decisions made at the world stage will not be considered without them and they can easily stand at each other’s back in the United Nations. There is presently a need for Africa to have a permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council and the Arab African can nominate one of their members. They will stand fiercely behind the country and canvass for support from other African countries.
2.Dewaal Alex, (2017), “The Emerging Global Order, Multilateralism and Africa”,https://www.sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2017/10/The-emerging-global-order-20170927.pdf. Pg. 8.
6.Kahler, Miles. "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers." International Organization, 46, 3 (Summer 1992),Pg. 681.
7.Light, M. (1984),” Problem-solving workshops: The Role of Scholarship in Conflict Resolution”. In: Banks, M. ed. Conflict in work society. Brighton, Wheatsheaf. Pg. 151.
8.Mitchell, Christopher R. (1989), “The structure of International Conflict”. London, Macmillan. Pg. 50.
There
are many studies that have been done in the area of Nigerian civil war but this
particular study will dwell on the causes, courses, post-conflict
reconstruction efforts.
This
study will make use of secondary sources. Books, journals, internet sources
will be extensively used.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE
STUDY
The
Nigeria civil war can be regarded as a war that was fought out of necessity
because the factors and causes that led to the war was sowed in the political
structures and institutions in colonial times and also in emergence of the
nation called Nigeria.It carried along
with it the seed.According to Madiebo
(1980, pg 3-14) “On the seed of destruction the federation of Nigeria has never really been one homogeneous country
due to the divergence of the people in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion,
historical and political antecedent”. Despite these obvious facts that exist,
the former colonial masters for selfish economic interest decided to forcefully
amalgamate the various ethnic groups together in 1914 and for administrative
convenience decided to adopt a policy of divide and rule between the various
regions.
It
is worthy of note that it was in this pattern of rule that Nigeria’s political
institution developed which was to have a bearing effect later after
independence which eventually led to the civil war.The growth of nationalism in the society and
subsequent emergence of political parties were based on ethnic/tribal rather
than national interest, and therefore had no unifying effect on the people
against the colonial master, Abubakar, (1992). Rather than being the victim
(colonial master), it was the people themselves who were the victim of the
political struggles which were supposed to be directed at removing foreign
dominance.Soon after independence the
battle to consolidate political and military power and dominance by one section
of the country became very intense among the ethnic group.This led to the January coup of 1966 and the
counter coup that followed and eventually a bloody civil war.
The
devastating effect of the war was of high impact on the populace as an estimated
1 million people died and equally the refugees’ crisis that followed with infrastructural
damage cannot be quantified. The major impact was felt in the eastern of
Nigeria which tried to break away to form the Republic of Biafra under a leader
called Odumegwu Ojukwu. With the fall of Biafra to Federal troops and the surrendering
of her troops, the next phase was a post-war peace building effort to
reconcile, rehabilitate and reconstruct as a result of the declaration of the
Federal Government of “no victor, no vanquished”.
BACKGROUND
HISTORY OF NIGERIA BEFORE THE WAR
The
land mass known today as Nigeria existed as a number of independent and
sometimes hostile national states with linguistic and cultural differences
until 1900. The Governor General of Nigeria between 1920-31, Sir Hugh Clifford,
described Nigeria as “a collection of independent Native States, separated from
one another by great distances, by differences of history and traditions and by
ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers." (Nigeria
Council Debate, Lagos,1920). The building of Nigeria as a multi - national
state began in 1900 with the creation of Northern and Southern Protectorates
along with the colony of Lagos by the British government. Further effort at
unification and integration was made in May 1906 when the colony of Lagos and
the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had existed separately, were
amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.
Even
then the Northern and the Southern Administration were separate and distinct. Both
were independent of one another and each was directly responsible to the
Colonial Office. The first momentous act of the British in the political
evolution of Nigeria as a modern state was the amalgamation of the
administration of the two sections of Nigeria on 1 January 1914 by Lord Lugard.
For ease of governing and in the economic interest of the British, indirect
rule and separate development policy were maintained in the two sections of the
country, with the amalgamated administration based in Lagos. This, in effect
produced two Nigeria, each with different social, political, economic, and
cultural backgrounds and development within the country.
No
further constitutional development took place until 1922. The 1922 constitution
made provision, for the first time, for elected members to sit on a Nigerian
legislative council, but did not empower them to make laws for the North. Nigeria
was divided into four administrative units in 1940; the colony of Lagos, the
Northern, Eastern and Western provinces. This administrative division, with
increased power for the colony and the provinces, was not only maintained but
separateness was also strengthened and deepened by Sir Arthur Richardson's
constitution of 1946 which inaugurated Nigeria's regionalism. It however
achieved a half - hearted political breakthrough by integrating the North with
the South at the legislative level for the first time.
The
post Second World War political awareness and upsurge of nationalism in Africa
brought about the Richardson's constitution of 1950.Political parties were formed on regional and
ethnic basis. The outcome of this was obvious: full scale regionalism. With the
Macpherson's constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was granted
the regions with stronger regional legislatures. With only residual powers left
to the central government, Nigeria politically took a turn for the worse, and
there was a possibility of three countries emerging out of Nigeria.
In
1953, the central cabinet was split over the acceptance of a target date for
securing self - government with the end result of the Kano riot.The gap between the regions widened.For the first time the North talked openly of
the possibility of secession rather than endure what they saw as humiliation
and ill - treatment.The West also
threatened to secede over the non - inclusion of Lagos in the West in the new
constitution.The 1954 constitution
confirmed and formalized the wishes of Nigerian leaders to move and remain as
far apart as they possibly could.The
choice between Unitary and Federal options in the form of government had been
irrevocably made.The leaders settled
for Federal option.Thereafter things
happened fast in the political arena.There were constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, and 1959 and in
1960 culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, 1960.
It
should be noted that from 1954 onwards, the political direction was
constantly away from a strong center towards a formidable, almost insulation of
the regional base of each major political party.The failure of the Willink commission to
recommend the creation of more states in 1958 for the Nigerian type of
federalism planted the most potent seed of instability into the evolution of
Nigeria as a nation in the 1950s.All
the political leaders who had strong and firm political bases in the regions
fought hard for maximum powers for the regions which weakened the center.At the same time, the ugly embers of
tribalism and sectionalism had been fanned into a deadly flame by all the
political leaders.These leaders rode on
the crest of this cancerous tribalism and ignorance of the people to power, at
the expense of national unity and the nation.
Instead
of regionalism ensuring and preserving national unity, it became its bane.
There was diffusion instead of fusion of the three units.According to Gen. Obasanjo:"The only point on which Nigerian
political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British of political
independence - and even then they did not agree on the timing."(1980:3). With the granting of independence
in 1960 all the dirt that have been swept under the carpet surfaced. Nigeria
was now beset by strings of political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided
nature of the political divisions of the country, the type of the existing
federal constitution, and the spirit in which it operated.
The
first post independence disturbance was over the defense agreement between
Great Britain and Nigeria, which was seen as "an attempt (by Britain) to
swindle Nigeria out of her sovereignty", by contracting with Nigeria to offer
each other such assistance as may be necessary for mutual defense and to
consult together on measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the
fullest cooperation between them for this purpose.It was viewed as an unequal treaty.Through student demonstrations and vehement
opposition by the general public and members of the Federal House of
Representatives, the agreement was abrogated in December 1962.
This
episode was nothing compared with later developments in the country's turbulent
political history.The general census
conducted in 1962 was alleged to be riddled with malpractices and inflation of
figures of such astronomical proportions that the Eastern Region refused to
accept the result. A second census was carried out in 1963, and even then the
figures were accepted with some reservations. Meanwhile the people of the
Middle Belt area of the North had grown increasingly intolerant of the NPC rule
of the North.The Tiv, one of the major
tribes in the Middle Belt, openly rioted for almost three years (1962 -
1965).Then came the biggest crisis of
them all - the general election of 1964.The election was alleged to be neither free nor fair. All devices
imaginable were said to have been used by the ruling parties in the regions to
eliminate opponents.
The
Chairman of the Electoral Commission himself admitted there were proven
irregularities.The President, Dr Nnamdi
Azikiwe refused to appoint a Prime Minister in the light of these
allegations.The President and the
incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were each seeking the
support of the Armed Forces.This marked
the first involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan politics. For four
anxious days, the nation waited until the President announced that he had
appointed the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form a
broad based government.The same could
not be said of the Western Region election of 1965.The rigging and irregularities in the
election were alleged to be more brazen and more shameful.Law and order broke down completely leading
to an almost complete state of anarchy.Arson and indiscriminate killings were committed by a private army of
thugs of political parties.Law abiding
citizens lived in constant fear of their lives and properties.
This
was the state of affairs when the coup of 15 January 1966 took place."As an immediate cause, it might be
claimed that the explosion of that day could be traced back along the powder
trail to the fuse lit at the time of the Western Region election of October
1965."(Obasanjo 1980). The aim of the coup was to establish a strong,
unified and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. The
outcome of the half-hearted and ill-fated coup was a change of political
balance in the country. Major Nzeogwu’s (the leader of the coup) aim for the
coup was not borne out of its method, style and results. All the politicians
and senior military officers killed were from the North and Western Region
except a political leader and a senior Army officer from the Mid - West and the
East respectively.
The
coup hastened the collapse of Nigeria. From independence to January 1966, the
country had been in a serious turmoil; but the coup put her in an even greater
situation. Most of the coup planners were of Eastern origin, thus the
Northerners in particular saw it as a deliberate plan to eliminate the
political heavy weights in the North in order to pave way for the Easterners to
take over the leadership role from them.The sky high praises of the coup and apparent relief given by it in the
south came to a sudden end when the succeeding Military Government of Maj. Gen.
J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, an Easterner, unfolded its plans.If Ironsi had displayed a greater sensitivity
to the thinking of the Northerners, he could have capitalized on the relief
that immediately followed the coup.
But
in addition to his failure to take advantage of the initial favorable reaction
to the coup, he did not know what to do with the ring leaders who had been
arrested. He did not know whether to treat them as heroes of the revolution or
send them before a court martial as mutineers and murderers.Military Governors were appointed to oversee
the administration of the regions.In
the North the numbed favorable reaction in certain quarters turned to studied
silence and a "wait and see" attitude. This gradually changed to
resentment, culminating in the May 1966 riots throughout the North during which
most Easterners residing in the North were attacked and killed.
A
counter coup was staged by the Northern military officers on 29 July 1966 with
two aims:revenge on the East, and a breakup
of the country. But the wise counsel of dedicated Nigerians, interested and
well-disposed foreigners prevailed. The Head of State, Maj. Gen Aguiyi Ironsi
and many other senior officers of Eastern origin were killed. After three
anxious days of fear, doubts and non-government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, at the
time the most senior officer of Northern origin and the then Chief of Staff,
Nigerian Army, emerged as the new Nigerian political leader.The lack of planning and the revengeful
intentions of the second coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion and the
scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the country.Even the authors of the coup could not stem
the general lawlessness and disorder, the senseless looting and killing which
spread through the North like wild fire on 29 September 1966.
Lt.
Col. Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, in a broadcast to the people of the
North in September said;"I receive
complaints daily that up till now Easterners living inthe North are being killed and molested and
their property looted.It appears that
it is going beyond reason and is now at a point of recklessness and
irresponsibility." (Atofarati,1992). Before then, in an effort to stop the
killings and to preserve the nation in one form or the other, an ad hoc
conference of the representatives of the regions was called on 9th August, 1966
in Lagos.The meeting made the following
recommendations:
1.Immediate steps should be taken to post
military personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin.
2.A meeting of this committee or an enlarged
body should take place to recommend in a broad
outline the form of politicalassociation
which the country should adopt in the future
3.Immediate steps should be taken to nullify
or modify any provisions of any decree which assumes extreme
centralization.
4.The Supreme Commander should make conditions
suitable for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further
means of lowering tension.
The
first recommendation was implemented on August 13 1966.Troops of Eastern Nigeria origin serving
elsewhere in the country were officially and formally released and posted to
Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region, while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu
moved to Kaduna and Lagos. This marked the beginning of division and disunity
within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces."This simple and seemingly innocuous
action broke the last thread and split the last institution symbolizing
Nigeria's nationhood and cohesion which had been regularly tampered with by the
politicians since 1962. The rift between the Eastern Region and the rest of the
country was total." (Obasanjo, 1980). Most of thecivilian of Eastern Region origin who had
never lived in the East and would have continued to live elsewhere in the
country lost confidence and moved to the East. Some of them when they arrived
at their destination became refugees in their own country.
None
of the other recommendations was fully implemented except nullification of the
unification decree. The implementation of the recommendation with regards to
the posting of troops to barracks within their region of origin was
relentlessly pursued by the political leaders of Western Region after the
exercise had been completed in the Eastern Region.They were afraid of the so - called Northern troop’s
domination and probably of the safety of the troops of Western Region origin.
With
the troops of Eastern Region back in Enugu and the non-Eastern troops withdrawn
from there, with Nigerians of non-Eastern origin driven out of the East in
their own interest, and with Easterners at home and abroad returning home with
news of Nigeria's brutality against them, and with the oil flowing in the
Eastern Region, the way was now open for the implementation of the secession. The
East and the North began a virulent of words through their radios and
newspapers. Early in 1967, a peace negotiating meeting of the Supreme Military
Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern Region Military
Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwu was called under the auspices of Gen. Ankrah of Ghana
in Aburi, Ghana.As it turned out, all
the other members of the council except Ojukwu were too trusting, too naive or
too ill - prepared for the meeting.Therefore Ojukwu scored a vital goal in his ambition.
Ojukwu
got his way with little effort, by being the cleverest.He was the only one who understood the issue.
Step by step the others came to acquiesce in the logic of Ojukwu's basic thesis
- that to stay together at all, the regions had first to draw apart. Only Ojukwu
understood that this meant, in effect, a sovereign Biafra (Eastern Region) and
the end of the Federation.Different versions of what happened in Aburi were
released by Ojukwu in the East and by the Federal Military Government in Lagos.
Ojukwu accused the Federal Government of bad faith and going back on promises. The
Federal Government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half truths. After several
meetings amongst the Federal and Regional officials, what amounted to the
demise of the Federation was promulgated in decree No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in a
desperate effort to implement the Aburi decisions and to avoid further
stalemate and possible civil war. Not surprisingly, Ojukwu completely rejected
Decree No. 8 as falling short of full implementation of Aburi decisions. The
die was cast. All efforts to intervene by eminent Nigerians and well - wishers
to Nigeria like Gen. Ankrah,late
Emperor Hallie Selassie of Ethiopia and the late Dr Martin Luther King proved
abortive.
The
flurry of conciliatory meetings achieved nothing.Gen. Obasanjo remarked:"Ojukwu was adamant, obstinate and
obdurate.He refused to attend the
Supreme Military Government meeting called in March in Benin City, Nigeria to
discuss outstanding issues and deliberate on the budget for the coming fiscal
year.If he could not achieve his long
cherished ambition of ruling an independent Nigeria, he could break it up and
rule an independent and sovereign "Biafra."Nothing could stop him." (1980:10). As early as 7 June 1966, after the May
incident in the North, Ojukwu was quoted as saying:We are finished with the Federation.It is all a question of time."(1980:11).
Ojukwu
seized the Federal Government property and funds in the East.He planned the hijacking of a National
commercial aircraft Fokker 27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos.All these and other signs and reports
convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu's intention to secede. Lt
Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal Government, imposed a total blockade of
the East. It was realized that more stringent action had to be taken to weaken
support for Ojukwu and to forestall his secession bid. Short of military action
at that time, creation of States by decree was the only weapon ready to hand. The
initial plan was to create States in the Eastern Region only. Such action was
considered impolitic and fraught with danger. Eventually 12 States were created
throughout the country on 27 May 1967.
The
Eastern Region was divided into three states. The reaction from Enugu was sharp
and quick:the declaration of Eastern
Nigeria as the independent sovereign state of "Biafra" on 30 May
1967.The month of June was used by both
sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its military arsenal and moved
troops to the border watching and waiting until the crack of the first bullet
at the dawn of 6 July 1967 from the Federal side. The war had started and the
dawn of a new history of Nigeria.
CAUSES
AND COURSE OF NIGERIA CIVIL WAR
The
Nigerian Civil War broke out on 6 July 1967. The war was the culmination of an
uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation from independence in
1960. This situation had its genesis in the geography, history, culture and
demography of Nigeria.
The
immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as the coup and the
counter coup of 1966 which altered the political equation and destroyed the
fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups.As a means of holding the country together in
the last result, the country was divided into twelve states from the original
four regions in May 1967.The former
Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu saw the act of the creation of states by
decree "without consultation" as the last straw, and declared the
Region an independent state of "Biafra".The Federal Government in Lagos saw this as
an act of secession and illegal.Several
meetings were held to resolve the issue peacefully without success.To avoid disintegration of the country, the
central government was left with only one choice of bringing back the region to
the main fold by force.
The
Federal sides expected a quick victory while the Biafran saw the war as that of
survival and were ready to fight to the last man. By August 1967, the war had
been extended to the Mid - Western Region by the Biafran with the aim to relief
pressure on the northern front and to threaten the Federal Capital, Lagos. Both
sides employed Political, Diplomatic, Psychological and Military strategies to
prosecute the war.
By
the end of April 1969, after almost two years of bloody and destructive war,
the envisioned quick victory had eluded the Federal side, the rebel enclave had
been drastically reduced in size but the Biafran were still holding on.More peace conferences were held but none
achieved a cease - fire and an end to the war.The Federals embarked on a strategic envelopment of the remaining
Biafran enclave.By the Christmas of
1969, it was obvious that the end of the civil war was near.
The
self - acclaimed Head of State of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, realizing the
hopelessness of the situation fled the enclave with his immediate family
members on the 10th of January 1970.The
Commander of the Biafran Army who took over the administration of the remaining
enclave surrendered to the Federal Government on 14th January 1970 bringing an
end to the war, secessionist attempt and bloodshed.
Several
lessons were learnt from the war and these have helped in the unification,
political, military and economical progress of the country.
PEACE
EFFORTS TO DEESCALATE THE NIGERIAN CIVILWAR
After the civil war
started, the organization of African Unity tried on its own to deescalate the
conflict.At its Kinshasa summit of
1967, a consultative omission of six heads of states headed by Emperor Haile
Sellasie 1 of Ethiopia was appointed. This committee visited the Federal
Government on 22 and 23 November 1967 and agreed that the secessionist should
renounce secession and accepts the structure of Federal Nigeria as in Decree NO
14 of 1967, (Elaigwu J.I 1986:123).This
incensed Ojukwu and his fellow secessionists and they made it clear that
Biafra’s sovereignty was not negotiable.
Further
efforts were made by the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Arnold Smith to deescalate
the conflict.Two attempts were made to
get both parties together in London failed.He, that is Mr. Arnold Smith finally succeeded in bringing the two sides
to meet in London on May 6, 1968.This
meeting eventually set the stage for the Kampala peace folks later.The peace folks in Kampala started on 23 May,
1968 and it finally packed up and broke down at the end of May.The Biafran side staged a walk out due to
some reasons, (Elaigwu J.I. 1986:123)
(1)That
Nigeria dictates rather than negotiates terms
(2)Nigeria
attempt to take advantage of the military situation at home
(3)Nigeria’s
refusal to call for a cease fire before negotiations could continue and
(4)Nigeria’s
refusal to withdraw federal troops to their positions before the civil war
The
OAU consultative committee arranged separate meetings between the two belligerents
in Niamey, Niger in July.General Gowon
addressed the meetings on July 16, while colonel Ojukwu addressed I ton July
18, 1968.Both then sides agreed to meet
in Addis Ababa for move peace talks.On
August 5, Chief Anthony Enakhoro led the Nigeria delegation while Ojukwu led
the Biafran delegation to Addis Ababa.Ojukwu later withdrew for Dr. Eni Njoku to act as the leader of the Biafran
side.This talk was deadlocked and had
to pack up on September 9, 1968.
A
number of peace talks were undertaken by individuals and groups.Among there were attempts by Lord Shepherd in
December 1968, Mr. Marice Foley (under secretary in the foreign and
commonwealth office), Lord Fenner Brockway (A British Labour Peer) and James
Griffiths (A labour MP).In January,
1969, Chief Obafemi Awolowo led a Nigerian delegation to London to hold
discussions with the secessionists, again this failed.There was another major attempt in April,
1969 at Monrovia where the OAU mission again met but failed to resolve the
issue.
There
was the OAU Assembly of states in Addis Ababa on 6 September, 1969.Eliagwu J.I. 1986:125 “The assembly resolved
that both sides of the Nigerian conflict should negotiate for a united Nigeria
so as to restore peace and stability to the country”.Gowon stated categorically at this meeting
that, there could be no peace unless the secessionists.
(1)Renounced
secession; and
(2)Accepted
the twelve states structure as the basis for the future existence of Nigeria
groups.
The
conflict finally deescalated by the formal surrender of the Biafran troops led
by Major General Philip Effiiong.General Ojukwu having fled the country to Abidjan on the 11th
of January, 1970 handed the reins of power to Gen. Effiong. On Monday 12
January 1970, General Effiong announced the surrender of Biafra and formerly
submitted and surrendered to Gen. Gowon in Lagos at the Dodan Barracks on the
15th January, 1970.A former
document stating the terms of surrender as quoted in Obasanjo O. (1980:134),
Eliagwu J.I. (1986:135).
I,
Major General Philip Effiong, officer administering the government of the
Republic of Biafra now wish to make the following declaration:
(a)That
the Republic of “Biafra” hereby renounces secession and ceases to exist;
(b)That
we affirm we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the
Federal Military Government of Nigeria;
(c)That
we accept the existing twelve-state structure of the federation of Nigeria;
(d)That
any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by the representative
of the people of Nigeria.
THE POST CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT
The
Federal Military Government set up the National Commission for Rehabilitation
in March 1968 mainly to take care of post-war reconstruction and
rehabilitation, Obasanjo (1980:164).This commission performed useful supplementary functions in the administration
of the liberated areas in form of social reconstruction, intensive vocational
training co-operative society, and liaison with employers, fostering of
children and mining of health rehabilitation centers.
Rehabilitation
and reconstruction of war damages commenced simultaneously as per the orders of
Gen. Gowon.General Gowon proclaimed
that there was no victor, no vanquished in order to rehabilitate the Igbos back
into the Nigerian fold, former civil servants were incorporated into the
relevant public services of the Federation (Eliagwu J.I., 1986:137), and former
Biafra officers were reabsorbed back into the Nigerian army (Obasanjo
1980:143).The Nigerian officers that
participated in the January 1966 coup and those that helped the secessionist
forces to invade the former Midwest were detained for a further period (Balogun
O. 1973:113).There was also the urgent
need to resettle farms, reopen factories and facilitate the resumption of
normal economic life.
Under
the three “Rs”, Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation there was the
need to restore electricity, water, transport and communication.General Gowon called for volunteers, doctors,
nurses, engineers, technicians, builders, plumbers, mechanics, administrators
and skilled hands (Eliagwu 1986:141) to assist in the reconstruction
process.Federal government troops went
about carrying food to where it was most needed and to refugees wherever
possible.
There
was also the problems rehabilitation and resettlement.The Igbo’s that left their homes and
businesses had these returned to them, and rent that was collected was given to
them, helping them to resettle.The
federal government spent quite an appreciable amount of money with regards to
rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement.Between 1970 – 1971, about N120 million worth
of cash and materials had been expended (Ibid pg 144).There was also a post-war Nation
Reconstruction and development plan for 1970 – 1974 which was launched on 1970
with definite objectives and priorities.Various government buildings received funds for its reconstruction.The University of Nsukka received N12 million
for its reconstruction, N6 million was spent on rehabilitation of
industries.The African Continental Bank
(ACB) was granted N5 million for its reopening (Ibid pg 145).
Through
massive federal aid, external assistance and efforts of the war affected areas
in self-help, Nigeria recovered faster than could have been expected in
reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
CONCLUSION
The
Nigeria civil war may have come and gone but the legacy of the war and the
lessons learnt should enable the nation to be able to maintain a balance and
focus both politically and socio-cultural, religious and ethnic integration, tolerance
and understand.
As
we have seen in the course of the study, the amalgamation of the nation was
born out of economic and political interest of the colonial master and not to
promote socio-cultural, religious, ethnic and political integration or unity of
the heterogeneous societies.Even after
the amalgamation, the policy of divide and rule system adopted in the governing
of the southern and northern protectorate did not do the nation any good but
further created a dichotomy between the north and south in terms of religious
and ethnic divergence.This obvious
situation led to political suspicious and rivalry during the colonial era and
in turn heated up the politics at the time which brought about unhealthy
competitions in political participations by various ethnic groups during and
after colonialism.With tribal sentiment
at its height immediate after independence and corruption wide spread among
political office holders, it became clear that the demise of the first Republic
was inevitable.
The
15th January 1966 coup with some other events that followed were
just the catalyst needed to create a volcanic eruption of ethnic clashes laying
in wait to happen which was to lead to the civil war of 1967 in Nigeria.But in all, it would be right to say that the
civil war was inevitable because the seeds that led to the war was sown in the
colonial policies which were inherited at independence by the founding fathers
and which they failed to see or understood or deliberately ignored due to the
quest for political dominance by various major ethnic group.In all we can say that they were the losers
and the nation was to suffer for it in the long run.
REFERENCES
Major
Alexander A. Madiebo, (1980).The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War,
Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.
Major
Abubakar A. Atofarati (1992).The Nigeria Civil War, causes strategies and
lessons learnt, student: US Marine Command and Staff College (Academic for
1991/1992.
Microsoft
Encerta Premium (2007) Archive Article, 1968; Nigeria: Civil War Background.
Eliagwu
J.I. (1956), “Gowon” Ibadan, West Books Publishers Limited.
Balogun
O. (1975), “The Tragic Years:Nigeria in Crisis 1966 – 1970; Benin
City, Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
Obasanjo
O. (1980), “My Command:An Account of the Nigerian Civil War,
1967-1970”, Ibadan, Heinemman Books.
