THE HISTORY, CAUSES, COURSE AND POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

THE HISTORY, CAUSES, COURSE AND POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

ABSTRACT

This study unearths the causes of the Nigerian civil war, the course and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the Nigerian government.  The conflict partly caused by the 1966 coup d’état, the Aguiyi agreement/commission and a host of other minor causes.

There are many studies that have been done in the area of Nigerian civil war but this particular study will dwell on the causes, courses, post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

This study will make use of secondary sources. Books, journals, internet sources will be extensively used.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The Nigeria civil war can be regarded as a war that was fought out of necessity because the factors and causes that led to the war was sowed in the political structures and institutions in colonial times and also in emergence of the nation called Nigeria.  It carried along with it the seed.  According to Madiebo (1980, pg 3-14) “On the seed of destruction the federation of Nigeria  has never really been one homogeneous country due to the divergence of the people in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, historical and political antecedent”. Despite these obvious facts that exist, the former colonial masters for selfish economic interest decided to forcefully amalgamate the various ethnic groups together in 1914 and for administrative convenience decided to adopt a policy of divide and rule between the various regions.

It is worthy of note that it was in this pattern of rule that Nigeria’s political institution developed which was to have a bearing effect later after independence which eventually led to the civil war.  The growth of nationalism in the society and subsequent emergence of political parties were based on ethnic/tribal rather than national interest, and therefore had no unifying effect on the people against the colonial master, Abubakar, (1992). Rather than being the victim (colonial master), it was the people themselves who were the victim of the political struggles which were supposed to be directed at removing foreign dominance.  Soon after independence the battle to consolidate political and military power and dominance by one section of the country became very intense among the ethnic group.  This led to the January coup of 1966 and the counter coup that followed and eventually a bloody civil war.

The devastating effect of the war was of high impact on the populace as an estimated 1 million people died and equally the refugees’ crisis that followed with infrastructural damage cannot be quantified. The major impact was felt in the eastern of Nigeria which tried to break away to form the Republic of Biafra under a leader called Odumegwu Ojukwu. With the fall of Biafra to Federal troops and the surrendering of her troops, the next phase was a post-war peace building effort to reconcile, rehabilitate and reconstruct as a result of the declaration of the Federal Government of “no victor, no vanquished”.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF NIGERIA BEFORE THE WAR

The land mass known today as Nigeria existed as a number of independent and sometimes hostile national states with linguistic and cultural differences until 1900. The Governor General of Nigeria between 1920-31, Sir Hugh Clifford, described Nigeria as “a collection of independent Native States, separated from one another by great distances, by differences of history and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers." (Nigeria Council Debate, Lagos,1920). The building of Nigeria as a multi - national state began in 1900 with the creation of Northern and Southern Protectorates along with the colony of Lagos by the British government. Further effort at unification and integration was made in May 1906 when the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had existed separately, were amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

Even then the Northern and the Southern Administration were separate and distinct. Both were independent of one another and each was directly responsible to the Colonial Office. The first momentous act of the British in the political evolution of Nigeria as a modern state was the amalgamation of the administration of the two sections of Nigeria on 1 January 1914 by Lord Lugard. For ease of governing and in the economic interest of the British, indirect rule and separate development policy were maintained in the two sections of the country, with the amalgamated administration based in Lagos. This, in effect produced two Nigeria, each with different social, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds and development within the country.  

No further constitutional development took place until 1922. The 1922 constitution made provision, for the first time, for elected members to sit on a Nigerian legislative council, but did not empower them to make laws for the North. Nigeria was divided into four administrative units in 1940; the colony of Lagos, the Northern, Eastern and Western provinces. This administrative division, with increased power for the colony and the provinces, was not only maintained but separateness was also strengthened and deepened by Sir Arthur Richardson's constitution of 1946 which inaugurated Nigeria's regionalism. It however achieved a half - hearted political breakthrough by integrating the North with the South at the legislative level for the first time.

The post Second World War political awareness and upsurge of nationalism in Africa brought about the Richardson's constitution of 1950.  Political parties were formed on regional and ethnic basis. The outcome of this was obvious: full scale regionalism. With the Macpherson's constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was granted the regions with stronger regional legislatures. With only residual powers left to the central government, Nigeria politically took a turn for the worse, and there was a possibility of three countries emerging out of Nigeria.

In 1953, the central cabinet was split over the acceptance of a target date for securing self - government with the end result of the Kano riot.  The gap between the regions widened.  For the first time the North talked openly of the possibility of secession rather than endure what they saw as humiliation and ill - treatment.  The West also threatened to secede over the non - inclusion of Lagos in the West in the new constitution.  The 1954 constitution confirmed and formalized the wishes of Nigerian leaders to move and remain as far apart as they possibly could.  The choice between Unitary and Federal options in the form of government had been irrevocably made.  The leaders settled for Federal option.  Thereafter things happened fast in the political arena.  There were constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, and 1959 and in 1960 culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, 1960.

It should be noted that from 1954 onwards, the political direction was constantly away from a strong center towards a formidable, almost insulation of the regional base of each major political party.  The failure of the Willink commission to recommend the creation of more states in 1958 for the Nigerian type of federalism planted the most potent seed of instability into the evolution of Nigeria as a nation in the 1950s.  All the political leaders who had strong and firm political bases in the regions fought hard for maximum powers for the regions which weakened the center.  At the same time, the ugly embers of tribalism and sectionalism had been fanned into a deadly flame by all the political leaders.  These leaders rode on the crest of this cancerous tribalism and ignorance of the people to power, at the expense of national unity and the nation.

Instead of regionalism ensuring and preserving national unity, it became its bane. There was diffusion instead of fusion of the three units.  According to Gen. Obasanjo:  "The only point on which Nigerian political leaders spoke with one voice was the granting by the British of political independence - and even then they did not agree on the timing."  (1980:3). With the granting of independence in 1960 all the dirt that have been swept under the carpet surfaced. Nigeria was now beset by strings of political problems which stemmed from the lop-sided nature of the political divisions of the country, the type of the existing federal constitution, and the spirit in which it operated.   

The first post independence disturbance was over the defense agreement between Great Britain and Nigeria, which was seen as "an attempt (by Britain) to swindle Nigeria out of her sovereignty", by contracting with Nigeria to offer each other such assistance as may be necessary for mutual defense and to consult together on measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest cooperation between them for this purpose.  It was viewed as an unequal treaty.  Through student demonstrations and vehement opposition by the general public and members of the Federal House of Representatives, the agreement was abrogated in December 1962.

This episode was nothing compared with later developments in the country's turbulent political history.  The general census conducted in 1962 was alleged to be riddled with malpractices and inflation of figures of such astronomical proportions that the Eastern Region refused to accept the result. A second census was carried out in 1963, and even then the figures were accepted with some reservations. Meanwhile the people of the Middle Belt area of the North had grown increasingly intolerant of the NPC rule of the North.  The Tiv, one of the major tribes in the Middle Belt, openly rioted for almost three years (1962 - 1965).  Then came the biggest crisis of them all - the general election of 1964.  The election was alleged to be neither free nor fair. All devices imaginable were said to have been used by the ruling parties in the regions to eliminate opponents.

The Chairman of the Electoral Commission himself admitted there were proven irregularities.  The President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe refused to appoint a Prime Minister in the light of these allegations.  The President and the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were each seeking the support of the Armed Forces.  This marked the first involvement of the Armed Forces in partisan politics. For four anxious days, the nation waited until the President announced that he had appointed the incumbent Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form a broad based government.  The same could not be said of the Western Region election of 1965.  The rigging and irregularities in the election were alleged to be more brazen and more shameful.  Law and order broke down completely leading to an almost complete state of anarchy.  Arson and indiscriminate killings were committed by a private army of thugs of political parties.  Law abiding citizens lived in constant fear of their lives and properties.  

This was the state of affairs when the coup of 15 January 1966 took place.   "As an immediate cause, it might be claimed that the explosion of that day could be traced back along the powder trail to the fuse lit at the time of the Western Region election of October 1965."(Obasanjo 1980). The aim of the coup was to establish a strong, unified and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. The outcome of the half-hearted and ill-fated coup was a change of political balance in the country. Major Nzeogwu’s (the leader of the coup) aim for the coup was not borne out of its method, style and results. All the politicians and senior military officers killed were from the North and Western Region except a political leader and a senior Army officer from the Mid - West and the East respectively.

The coup hastened the collapse of Nigeria. From independence to January 1966, the country had been in a serious turmoil; but the coup put her in an even greater situation. Most of the coup planners were of Eastern origin, thus the Northerners in particular saw it as a deliberate plan to eliminate the political heavy weights in the North in order to pave way for the Easterners to take over the leadership role from them.  The sky high praises of the coup and apparent relief given by it in the south came to a sudden end when the succeeding Military Government of Maj. Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, an Easterner, unfolded its plans.  If Ironsi had displayed a greater sensitivity to the thinking of the Northerners, he could have capitalized on the relief that immediately followed the coup.

But in addition to his failure to take advantage of the initial favorable reaction to the coup, he did not know what to do with the ring leaders who had been arrested. He did not know whether to treat them as heroes of the revolution or send them before a court martial as mutineers and murderers.  Military Governors were appointed to oversee the administration of the regions.  In the North the numbed favorable reaction in certain quarters turned to studied silence and a "wait and see" attitude. This gradually changed to resentment, culminating in the May 1966 riots throughout the North during which most Easterners residing in the North were attacked and killed.

A counter coup was staged by the Northern military officers on 29 July 1966 with two aims:  revenge on the East, and a breakup of the country. But the wise counsel of dedicated Nigerians, interested and well-disposed foreigners prevailed. The Head of State, Maj. Gen Aguiyi Ironsi and many other senior officers of Eastern origin were killed. After three anxious days of fear, doubts and non-government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, at the time the most senior officer of Northern origin and the then Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army, emerged as the new Nigerian political leader.  The lack of planning and the revengeful intentions of the second coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion and the scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the country.   Even the authors of the coup could not stem the general lawlessness and disorder, the senseless looting and killing which spread through the North like wild fire on 29 September 1966.

Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, in a broadcast to the people of the North in September said;  "I receive complaints daily that up till now Easterners living in  the North are being killed and molested and their property looted.  It appears that it is going beyond reason and is now at a point of recklessness and irresponsibility." (Atofarati,1992). Before then, in an effort to stop the killings and to preserve the nation in one form or the other, an ad hoc conference of the representatives of the regions was called on 9th August, 1966 in Lagos.  The meeting made the following recommendations:

1.            Immediate steps should be taken to post military personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin.

2.            A meeting of this committee or an enlarged body should take place to recommend in      a broad outline the form of political  association which the country should adopt in the future  

3.            Immediate steps should be taken to nullify or modify any provisions of any decree which assumes extreme centralization. 

4.            The Supreme Commander should make conditions suitable for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further means of lowering tension.

The first recommendation was implemented on August 13 1966.  Troops of Eastern Nigeria origin serving elsewhere in the country were officially and formally released and posted to Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region, while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu moved to Kaduna and Lagos. This marked the beginning of division and disunity within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces.  "This simple and seemingly innocuous action broke the last thread and split the last institution symbolizing Nigeria's nationhood and cohesion which had been regularly tampered with by the politicians since 1962. The rift between the Eastern Region and the rest of the country was total." (Obasanjo, 1980). Most of the  civilian of Eastern Region origin who had never lived in the East and would have continued to live elsewhere in the country lost confidence and moved to the East. Some of them when they arrived at their destination became refugees in their own country.

None of the other recommendations was fully implemented except nullification of the unification decree. The implementation of the recommendation with regards to the posting of troops to barracks within their region of origin was relentlessly pursued by the political leaders of Western Region after the exercise had been completed in the Eastern Region.  They were afraid of the so - called Northern troop’s domination and probably of the safety of the troops of Western Region origin.

With the troops of Eastern Region back in Enugu and the non-Eastern troops withdrawn from there, with Nigerians of non-Eastern origin driven out of the East in their own interest, and with Easterners at home and abroad returning home with news of Nigeria's brutality against them, and with the oil flowing in the Eastern Region, the way was now open for the implementation of the secession. The East and the North began a virulent of words through their radios and newspapers. Early in 1967, a peace negotiating meeting of the Supreme Military Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern Region Military Governor, Lt. Col. Ojukwu was called under the auspices of Gen. Ankrah of Ghana in Aburi, Ghana.  As it turned out, all the other members of the council except Ojukwu were too trusting, too naive or too ill - prepared for the meeting.  Therefore Ojukwu scored a vital goal in his ambition.

Ojukwu got his way with little effort, by being the cleverest.  He was the only one who understood the issue. Step by step the others came to acquiesce in the logic of Ojukwu's basic thesis - that to stay together at all, the regions had first to draw apart. Only Ojukwu understood that this meant, in effect, a sovereign Biafra (Eastern Region) and the end of the Federation.Different versions of what happened in Aburi were released by Ojukwu in the East and by the Federal Military Government in Lagos. Ojukwu accused the Federal Government of bad faith and going back on promises. The Federal Government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half truths. After several meetings amongst the Federal and Regional officials, what amounted to the demise of the Federation was promulgated in decree No. 8 of 17 March 1967 in a desperate effort to implement the Aburi decisions and to avoid further stalemate and possible civil war. Not surprisingly, Ojukwu completely rejected Decree No. 8 as falling short of full implementation of Aburi decisions. The die was cast. All efforts to intervene by eminent Nigerians and well - wishers to Nigeria like Gen. Ankrah,  late Emperor Hallie Selassie of Ethiopia and the late Dr Martin Luther King proved abortive. 

The flurry of conciliatory meetings achieved nothing.  Gen. Obasanjo remarked:  "Ojukwu was adamant, obstinate and obdurate.  He refused to attend the Supreme Military Government meeting called in March in Benin City, Nigeria to discuss outstanding issues and deliberate on the budget for the coming fiscal year.  If he could not achieve his long cherished ambition of ruling an independent Nigeria, he could break it up and rule an independent and sovereign "Biafra."   Nothing could stop him." (1980:10).  As early as 7 June 1966, after the May incident in the North, Ojukwu was quoted as saying:   We are finished with the Federation.  It is all a question of time."  (1980:11).

Ojukwu seized the Federal Government property and funds in the East.  He planned the hijacking of a National commercial aircraft Fokker 27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos.  All these and other signs and reports convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu's intention to secede. Lt Col. Yakubu Gowon, the Head of Federal Government, imposed a total blockade of the East. It was realized that more stringent action had to be taken to weaken support for Ojukwu and to forestall his secession bid. Short of military action at that time, creation of States by decree was the only weapon ready to hand. The initial plan was to create States in the Eastern Region only. Such action was considered impolitic and fraught with danger. Eventually 12 States were created throughout the country on 27 May 1967.

The Eastern Region was divided into three states. The reaction from Enugu was sharp and quick:  the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as the independent sovereign state of "Biafra" on 30 May 1967.  The month of June was used by both sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its military arsenal and moved troops to the border watching and waiting until the crack of the first bullet at the dawn of 6 July 1967 from the Federal side. The war had started and the dawn of a new history of Nigeria.

CAUSES AND COURSE OF NIGERIA CIVIL WAR

The Nigerian Civil War broke out on 6 July 1967. The war was the culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation from independence in 1960. This situation had its genesis in the geography, history, culture and demography of Nigeria.  

The immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as the coup and the counter coup of 1966 which altered the political equation and destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups.  As a means of holding the country together in the last result, the country was divided into twelve states from the original four regions in May 1967.  The former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu saw the act of the creation of states by decree "without consultation" as the last straw, and declared the Region an independent state of "Biafra".  The Federal Government in Lagos saw this as an act of secession and illegal.  Several meetings were held to resolve the issue peacefully without success.  To avoid disintegration of the country, the central government was left with only one choice of bringing back the region to the main fold by force.

The Federal sides expected a quick victory while the Biafran saw the war as that of survival and were ready to fight to the last man. By August 1967, the war had been extended to the Mid - Western Region by the Biafran with the aim to relief pressure on the northern front and to threaten the Federal Capital, Lagos. Both sides employed Political, Diplomatic, Psychological and Military strategies to prosecute the war.

By the end of April 1969, after almost two years of bloody and destructive war, the envisioned quick victory had eluded the Federal side, the rebel enclave had been drastically reduced in size but the Biafran were still holding on.  More peace conferences were held but none achieved a cease - fire and an end to the war.  The Federals embarked on a strategic envelopment of the remaining Biafran enclave.  By the Christmas of 1969, it was obvious that the end of the civil war was near.

The self - acclaimed Head of State of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, realizing the hopelessness of the situation fled the enclave with his immediate family members on the 10th of January 1970.  The Commander of the Biafran Army who took over the administration of the remaining enclave surrendered to the Federal Government on 14th January 1970 bringing an end to the war, secessionist attempt and bloodshed.

Several lessons were learnt from the war and these have helped in the unification, political, military and economical progress of the country.

PEACE EFFORTS TO DEESCALATE THE NIGERIAN CIVILWAR

After the civil war started, the organization of African Unity tried on its own to deescalate the conflict.  At its Kinshasa summit of 1967, a consultative omission of six heads of states headed by Emperor Haile Sellasie 1 of Ethiopia was appointed. This committee visited the Federal Government on 22 and 23 November 1967 and agreed that the secessionist should renounce secession and accepts the structure of Federal Nigeria as in Decree NO 14 of 1967, (Elaigwu J.I 1986:123).  This incensed Ojukwu and his fellow secessionists and they made it clear that Biafra’s sovereignty was not negotiable.

Further efforts were made by the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Arnold Smith to deescalate the conflict.  Two attempts were made to get both parties together in London failed.  He, that is Mr. Arnold Smith finally succeeded in bringing the two sides to meet in London on May 6, 1968.  This meeting eventually set the stage for the Kampala peace folks later.  The peace folks in Kampala started on 23 May, 1968 and it finally packed up and broke down at the end of May.  The Biafran side staged a walk out due to some reasons, (Elaigwu J.I. 1986:123)

(1)   That Nigeria dictates rather than negotiates terms

(2)   Nigeria attempt to take advantage of the military situation at home

(3)   Nigeria’s refusal to call for a cease fire before negotiations could continue and

(4)   Nigeria’s refusal to withdraw federal troops to their positions before the civil war

The OAU consultative committee arranged separate meetings between the two belligerents in Niamey, Niger in July.  General Gowon addressed the meetings on July 16, while colonel Ojukwu addressed I ton July 18, 1968.  Both then sides agreed to meet in Addis Ababa for move peace talks.  On August 5, Chief Anthony Enakhoro led the Nigeria delegation while Ojukwu led the Biafran delegation to Addis Ababa.  Ojukwu later withdrew for Dr. Eni Njoku to act as the leader of the Biafran side.  This talk was deadlocked and had to pack up on September 9, 1968.

A number of peace talks were undertaken by individuals and groups.  Among there were attempts by Lord Shepherd in December 1968, Mr. Marice Foley (under secretary in the foreign and commonwealth office), Lord Fenner Brockway (A British Labour Peer) and James Griffiths (A labour MP).  In January, 1969, Chief Obafemi Awolowo led a Nigerian delegation to London to hold discussions with the secessionists, again this failed.  There was another major attempt in April, 1969 at Monrovia where the OAU mission again met but failed to resolve the issue.

There was the OAU Assembly of states in Addis Ababa on 6 September, 1969.  Eliagwu J.I. 1986:125 “The assembly resolved that both sides of the Nigerian conflict should negotiate for a united Nigeria so as to restore peace and stability to the country”.  Gowon stated categorically at this meeting that, there could be no peace unless the secessionists.

(1)   Renounced secession; and

(2)   Accepted the twelve states structure as the basis for the future existence of Nigeria groups.

The conflict finally deescalated by the formal surrender of the Biafran troops led by Major General Philip Effiiong.  General Ojukwu having fled the country to Abidjan on the 11^th of January, 1970 handed the reins of power to Gen. Effiong. On Monday 12 January 1970, General Effiong announced the surrender of Biafra and formerly submitted and surrendered to Gen. Gowon in Lagos at the Dodan Barracks on the 15^th January, 1970.  A former document stating the terms of surrender as quoted in Obasanjo O. (1980:134), Eliagwu J.I. (1986:135).

I, Major General Philip Effiong, officer administering the government of the Republic of Biafra now wish to make the following declaration:

(a)   That the Republic of “Biafra” hereby renounces secession and ceases to exist;

(b)   That we affirm we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria;

(c)   That we accept the existing twelve-state structure of the federation of Nigeria;

(d)   That any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by the representative of the people of Nigeria.

THE POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

The Federal Military Government set up the National Commission for Rehabilitation in March 1968 mainly to take care of post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation, Obasanjo (1980:164).  This commission performed useful supplementary functions in the administration of the liberated areas in form of social reconstruction, intensive vocational training co-operative society, and liaison with employers, fostering of children and mining of health rehabilitation centers.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of war damages commenced simultaneously as per the orders of Gen. Gowon.  General Gowon proclaimed that there was no victor, no vanquished in order to rehabilitate the Igbos back into the Nigerian fold, former civil servants were incorporated into the relevant public services of the Federation (Eliagwu J.I., 1986:137), and former Biafra officers were reabsorbed back into the Nigerian army (Obasanjo 1980:143).  The Nigerian officers that participated in the January 1966 coup and those that helped the secessionist forces to invade the former Midwest were detained for a further period (Balogun O. 1973:113).  There was also the urgent need to resettle farms, reopen factories and facilitate the resumption of normal economic life.

Under the three “Rs”, Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation there was the need to restore electricity, water, transport and communication.  General Gowon called for volunteers, doctors, nurses, engineers, technicians, builders, plumbers, mechanics, administrators and skilled hands (Eliagwu 1986:141) to assist in the reconstruction process.  Federal government troops went about carrying food to where it was most needed and to refugees wherever possible.

There was also the problems rehabilitation and resettlement.  The Igbo’s that left their homes and businesses had these returned to them, and rent that was collected was given to them, helping them to resettle.  The federal government spent quite an appreciable amount of money with regards to rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement.  Between 1970 – 1971, about N120 million worth of cash and materials had been expended (Ibid pg 144).  There was also a post-war Nation Reconstruction and development plan for 1970 – 1974 which was launched on 1970 with definite objectives and priorities.  Various government buildings received funds for its reconstruction.  The University of Nsukka received N12 million for its reconstruction, N6 million was spent on rehabilitation of industries.  The African Continental Bank (ACB) was granted N5 million for its reopening (Ibid pg 145).

Through massive federal aid, external assistance and efforts of the war affected areas in self-help, Nigeria recovered faster than could have been expected in reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

CONCLUSION

The Nigeria civil war may have come and gone but the legacy of the war and the lessons learnt should enable the nation to be able to maintain a balance and focus both politically and socio-cultural, religious and ethnic integration, tolerance and understand.

As we have seen in the course of the study, the amalgamation of the nation was born out of economic and political interest of the colonial master and not to promote socio-cultural, religious, ethnic and political integration or unity of the heterogeneous societies.  Even after the amalgamation, the policy of divide and rule system adopted in the governing of the southern and northern protectorate did not do the nation any good but further created a dichotomy between the north and south in terms of religious and ethnic divergence.  This obvious situation led to political suspicious and rivalry during the colonial era and in turn heated up the politics at the time which brought about unhealthy competitions in political participations by various ethnic groups during and after colonialism.  With tribal sentiment at its height immediate after independence and corruption wide spread among political office holders, it became clear that the demise of the first Republic was inevitable.

The 15^th January 1966 coup with some other events that followed were just the catalyst needed to create a volcanic eruption of ethnic clashes laying in wait to happen which was to lead to the civil war of 1967 in Nigeria.  But in all, it would be right to say that the civil war was inevitable because the seeds that led to the war was sown in the colonial policies which were inherited at independence by the founding fathers and which they failed to see or understood or deliberately ignored due to the quest for political dominance by various major ethnic group.  In all we can say that they were the losers and the nation was to suffer for it in the long run.

REFERENCES

Major Alexander A. Madiebo, (1980).  The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.

Major Abubakar A. Atofarati (1992).  The Nigeria Civil War, causes strategies and lessons learnt, student: US Marine Command and Staff College (Academic for 1991/1992.

Microsoft Encerta Premium (2007) Archive Article, 1968; Nigeria: Civil War Background.

Eliagwu J.I. (1956), “Gowon” Ibadan, West Books Publishers Limited.

Balogun O. (1975), “The Tragic Years:  Nigeria in Crisis 1966 – 1970; Benin City, Ethiope Publishing Corporation.

Obasanjo O. (1980), “My Command:  An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970”, Ibadan, Heinemman Books.